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Abstract
ROBOTS WERE ONCE RELEGATED to roles that were “dirty, dull, or dangerous,”3 such as welding parts on
car assembly lines, but today, they occupy more visible spaces in our workplaces, homes, and public
areas. This visibility has provoked questions frequently seen in media inciting moral panic: Will robots
cause job loss? Will robots become sentient? In The New Breed: What our History with Animals Reveals
About our Future with Robots (“The New Breed”), Kate Darling explains that these fears are misplaced and
that our tendency to anthropomorphize robots fosters false determinism. Darling imagines a different
kind of agency, drawing on our historical relationships with animals, to shape future thinking about robotic
technology. Reflecting on robots as a new breed or strain allows us to envision them as ontological
interpolations rather than human-replacements.
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The New Breed: What our History with
Animals Reveals About our Future with
Robots by Kate Darling1
AMANDA TURNBULL2
ROBOTS WERE ONCE RELEGATED to roles that were “dirty, dull, or dangerous,”3

such as welding parts on car assembly lines, but today, they occupy more visible
spaces in our workplaces, homes, and public areas. Tis visibility has provoked
questions frequently seen in media inciting moral panic: Will robots cause job
loss? Will robots become sentient? In Te New Breed: What our History with
Animals Reveals About our Future with Robots (“Te New Breed”), Kate Darling
explains that these fears are misplaced and that our tendency to anthropomorphize
robots fosters false determinism. Darling imagines a diferent kind of agency,
drawing on our historical relationships with animals, to shape future thinking
about robotic technology. Refecting on robots as a new breed or strain allows us
to envision them as ontological interpolations rather than human-replacements.
Te book is divided into three parts, which examine workplace integration,
companionship, and the treatment of robots. In the frst section, Darling explains,
“New technologies often inspire concern, but perhaps not quite in the same way

1.
2.

3.

(Henry Holt and Company, 2021).
Amanda Turnbull (she/her) is a PhD candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School and
Schulich Fellow, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. Te author is grateful
to Professor Carys Craig, Professor Kate Sutherland, and Professor Peter Oliver for their
continuing support.
Darling, supra note 1 at 7.
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as robots,”4 and although robotics is progressing, it is still limited to human
collaboration. In lieu of envisioning these limitations as part of a disrupted and
dystopic future beset by nefarious androids bent on exterminating humanity,
Darling suggests that we hit pause and question why we are trying to recreate
human skills. Rather, we should think about how robots supplement our abilities,
much like animals have done historically. Leech therapy, for example, dates to
ancient Egypt and is still in use today, mainly to aid with healing skin grafts.5
Ferrets have also historically complemented our skill set, and continue to do so in
the telecommunications industry, helping to run cable in narrow spaces.6
Te comparison to animals also has implications for responsibility within
the robotic domain. Darling identifes and separates direct harm caused by
industrial robots from indirect harm such as racial profling, gender bias, and
ableism precipitated by robots that are driven by code. She chooses to focus
only on autonomously caused physical harm in the book, aligning it with harm
prevention measures adopted historically in the animal realm. She provides a
range of examples, including the following: consequences for owners of habitually
goring oxen in Mesopotamia;7 laws that required owners to fence in animals in
order to prevent wandering pigs during the Industrial Revolution;8 more recently,
licenses to reduce the risk of aggressive dog behaviour in Austria;9 and funds for
sheep farmers to compensate them for losses incurred as the result of canine
attacks in the United States.10
Tese measures from the animal kingdom provide a template for dealing with
autonomously caused physical harm, but the indirect harm that Darling brackets
and sets aside—such as racial bias, gender bias, and ableism—is embedded in
society and is thus inseparable from direct harm. For example, in designing
service robots and their component technologies, what consideration is given to
inclusive space rather than to optimized space for robotic performance? Expressed
diferently, does “the devil” reside in the details of the design? Additionally, the
4.
5.

Ibid at 6.
US Food & Drug Administration, “Product Classifcation: Leeches, Medicinal” (7
March 2022), online: <www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPCD/classifcation.
cfm?ID=NRN> [perma.cc/CG4Y-5T2Y].
6. CABLExpress, “Ferrets: Te Best-Kept Secret in Cabling” (26 July 2016), online
(blog): <www.cablexpress.com/education/blog/ferrets-the-best-kept-secret-in-cabling>
[perma.cc/A63E-TGCT].
7. Darling, supra note 1 at 68.
8. Ibid at 70.
9. Ibid at 73.
10. Ibid at 74.
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scholarship on technology-facilitated violence informs us that technology is
not actually the problem when it comes to gendered and racialized harm.11 Te
problem is that technology amplifes the harm already present in society. Tis
is a very human problem, rather than an animal one. Te question arises, then,
does the animal comparison work in a more fulsome discussion of harm? Put
diferently, does Darling avoid discussing indirect harm because it exposes a faw
in the robot–animal comparison?
Putting aside harm prevention, Darling also deals with our societal penchant
for blame in her discussion of responsibility. Historically, we have attempted to
assign moral blame to animals—we even put them on trial for egregious conduct.
Rats, for example, were summoned to trial in Lucenay, France in the sixteenth
century for destroying barley crops.12 Animals were assigned moral responsibility
and put on trial for centuries. Today, she explains, it surfaces as a “new blame
game” involving alleged killer robots, spurring conversations about accountability,
for which there is also an alternative precedent: creating legal personhood as
we have done for the corporations13 and, more recently, rivers.14 Tis involves
ascribing legal rights and responsibilities to juristic—or artifcial—persons as we
would for natural persons. But, as Darling tells us, while the concept of legal
personhood may sort out how we divvy up responsibility amongst all who create,
build, program, and train robots, it may be overhasty. We have previously dealt
with divided responsibility with regard to animals between owners, trainers,
and handlers, and applying an animal lens of comparison may “[allow] us to
break out of the robot-human comparison mold.”15 Darling admits that it is not
perfect, but simply an alternative.
To reinforce her claim, she surveys the existing law and technology scholarship
that examines the shortcomings of the robot–human comparison: the android
11. Suzie Dunn, “Is it Actually Violence? Framing Technology-Facilitated Abuse as Violence”
in Jane Bailey, Asher Flynn & Nicola Henry, eds, Te Emerald International Handbook of
Technology-Facilitated Violence and Abuse (Emerald, 2021) 25.
12. Darling, supra note 1 at 78.
13. For a discussion of the faws inherent to the nature of the corporation, see Joel Bakan,
Te Corporation: Te Pathological Pursuit of Proft and Power (Penguin, 2004) [Bakan, Te
Corporation]. See also Joel Bakan, Te New Corporation: How “Good” Corporations are Bad for
Democracy (Allen Lane, 2020) [Bakan, Te New Corporation].
14. See e.g. Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ), 2017/7. See
also Sean Nixon, “Quebec River Has Legal Personhood: What Tat Means for Granting
Nature Rights,” Te Lawyer’s Daily (25 March 2021), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/
articles/25603/quebec-river-has-legal-personhood-what-that-means-for-granting-naturerights-sean-nixon> [perma.cc/52JW-K4SL].
15. Darling, supra note 1 at 82.
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fallacy,16 where we start to envision robots having free will just because they
look and act human; the development of incongruous legal doctrine as a result
of aligning the human and non-human;17 and escaped corporate and human
responsibility for unpredictable actions.18 While keeping a human in the loop is
one way that we have been avoiding unexpected outcomes as we automate our
workplaces, this model, too, has had unanticipated consequences where there is
shared blame—in the airline industry, for instance, where there have been crashes
resulting from both human and machine error. Here, again, we have solutions for
this sort of liability, but we perceive the situation diferently. It creates a “moral
crumple zone”19 where responsibility is misattributed to humans and may result in
potential new forms of worker harm. Our default anthropocentric narrative needs
a corrective that Darling suggests may be found in a comparison with animals.
In the second part of the book, Darling discusses companionship between
humans and robots. As social animals, we project our own experiences and
emotions onto both beings and non-beings: From our family pets and childhood
teddy bears to naming our cars, we are yoked to our need to project ourselves
in order to stave of loneliness and survive. We are now seeing therapeutic social
robots being used in elder care, like PARO the robot seal.20 In the education
setting, Human Robot Interaction (HRI) research investigates how children
engage with robotic teaching assistants.21 During the ongoing pandemic, Spot
the robo-dog was engaged to enforce social distancing in parks in Singapore.22
Further, authors like Kazuo Ishiguro are writing books written from the point of

16. See Neil M Richards & William D Smart, “How Should the Law Tink About Robots?” in
Ryan Calo, A Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr, eds, Robot Law (Edward Elgar, 2016) 3 at 4.
17. See e.g. Ryan Calo, “Robots in American Law” (2016) University of Washington School
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 2016-04, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2737598> [perma.cc/56F5-GKG7].
18. See e.g. Peter M Asaro, “A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives on
Robotics” in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George A Bekey, eds, Robot Ethics: Te Ethical and
Social Implications of Robotics (MIT Press, 2012) 169 at 182.
19. Madeleine Clare Elish, “Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot
Interaction” (2019) 5 Engaging Science, Technology & Society 40 at 40.
20. See PARO Robots, “PARO Terapeutic Robot” (2014), online: <www.parorobots.com>
[perma.cc/SY8T-85LC].
21. See e.g. Peter H Khan Jr & Solace Shen, “NOC NOC, Who’s Tere? A New Ontological
Category (NOC) for Social Robots” in Nancy Budwig, Elliot Turiel & Philip David Zelazo,
eds, New Perspectives on Human Development (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 106.
22. Maryam Shah, “Robot ‘dog’ Named Spot to Help Social Distancing Eforts at Singapore
Park,” Global News (9 May 2020), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6925970/singapore-robotdog-park-coronavirus> [perma.cc/GNT5-NM42].
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view of a companion robot,23 efecting a new narrative voice in literature. Tese
examples give rise to more misplaced moral panic: Is it ethical to bond with a robot?
Darling suggests that we just need to reorient the robot-as-humansubstitute mindset to one of robot-as-supplement: “Like animals, social robots
give us an opportunity to learn, not just about new challenges with technology
integration but also about ourselves.”24 What we ought to be worried about is
not robotic companionship with non-beings, but rather how these relationships
could be exploited through, for instance, predatory corporate behaviour.25 Our
anthropocentric focus obscures the fact that corporations have carte blanche in
respect of how they use our emotional attachments to social robots.
Te fnal section of the book tackles the issue of how we treat robots. In this
section, Darling also draws on our “incredibly convoluted”26 history of animal
rights, which is a crucial topic that arguably could have been raised earlier
in the book in order to address the incongruity of animal needs and human
goals. She highlights the history of this incongruity: In Ancient Greece, for
example, philosophers advocated for kindness toward animals, and in India,
the doctrine of ahimsa emphasizes non-violence toward all living creatures.27
In Europe, however, poor treatment of animals was rife until the upper class
began bonding with their pets during the Victorian era.28 It was empathy,
as opposed to philosophy, that led to positive change in the treatment of animals.
Further, the anti-vivisectionist movement, which was tied to the work of the
sufragettes—specifcally, Frances Power Cobbe—led to the world’s frst animal
protection law.29 In light of this, animal law may be seen as always having had
an intersectional framework. Tis is an important point that Darling could have
emphasized: Te animal-robot comparison ofers a more inclusive and balanced
default narrative for thinking about robotic agency since it contemplates how
experience and identities intermingle.
Although Darling provides an overview of the complicated history of animal
rights, she does not address the uncomfortable issue of eclipsing animals’ needs
for our empathetic needs. Prioritizing human needs simply reinscribes the failed
23. Klara and the Sun (Alfred A Knopf, 2021).
24. Darling, supra note 1 at 172.
25. See Ian R Kerr, “Bots, Babes and the Californication of Commerce” (2003) 1 UOLTJ 285.
See also Douglas Rushkof, Coercion: Why We Listen to What “Tey” Say (Riverhead Books,
1999); Bakan, Te Corporation, supra note 13; Bakan, Te New Corporation, supra note 13.
26. Darling, supra note 1 at 188.
27. Ibid at 188.
28. Ibid.
29. Cruelty to Animals Act (UK), 1876, 39 & 40 Vict, c 77; Darling, supra note 1 at 191.
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system that we have had in place since antiquity. Recent scholarship by Maneesha
Deckha highlights how our legal system repeatedly fails to account for the systemic
violence against animals through its binary property-personhood paradigm,
suggesting instead a new legal subjectivity that is not based on personhood.30
Tis work may be helpful in furthering Darling’s new starting point.
“Our tendency to anthropomorphize animals is deep,”31 and we see this
refected not only in our companionship with animals but elsewhere in society
through, for example, Anna Sewell’s perennially best-selling novel, Black Beauty,32
or Greenpeace’s “Save the Whales” campaign.33 However, at the same time,
we continue to consume meat, bringing Darling to her point that we “separate
animals into friends, workers [and] food.”34 We are inconsistent. Darling
acknowledges that “putting robot rights and animal rights side-by-side can be
problematic,”35 but she clarifes that it is not about equating the two, but about
drawing parallels as an alternative to the robot-as-human analogy.
Te New Breed is accessible to a wide-ranging readership since Darling
provides an engaging survey of the social, legal, and ethical perspectives in
robotics and pairs it with the challenging topic of animal history. Ultimately,
Darling accomplishes what she set out to do: provide a biomimetic36 starting
point to reposition the fawed, fctitious thinking that robots will replace us.
Some robots will be tools, others will be companions;37 we do have choices about
how to integrate robots in society.

30. Animals as Legal Beings: Contesting Anthropocentric Legal Orders (University of Toronto
Press, 2021).
31. Darling, supra note 1 at 196.
32. Anna Sewell, Black Beauty (Hodder & Stoughton, 1973).
33. Willie Mackenzie, “A Brief History of Commercial Whaling and Greenpeace” (10 September
2018), online (blog): <www.greenpeace.org/international/story/18307/history-commercialwhaling-greenpeace> [perma.cc/TVG3-N7BP].
34. Darling, supra note 1 at 202.
35. Ibid at 220.
36. Biomimetics “is a broad academic trend of looking to solutions in nature in order to
problem-solve” (ibid at 103).
37. Darling has previously articulated the position that agency is dependent upon the function
of the particular technology—in some cases it will be a tool, in others, it will be a social
actor. See Kate Darling, “‘Who’s Johnny?’ Anthropomorphic Framing in Human-Robot
Interaction, Integration, and Policy” in Patrick Lin, Ryan Jenkins & Keith Abney, eds,
Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artifcial Intelligence (Oxford University
Press, 2017) 173.

